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Vertically Differentiated Information Goods:
Entry Deterrence, Rivalry Clear-out or Coexistence
Abstract
In this paper we develop models to analyze price, quality and versioning strategies of
information goods producers to deter entry and maintain market power. We find that in a
competitive environment, firms provide higher quality information goods with a better “price
quality ratio” than in a monopoly. In the high-end market an incumbent monopolist can
strategically set its quality to deter entry. In the low-end market, the incumbent monopolist
can implement versioning strategies to deter entry and different versions exist as a signal to
prevent potential entry. A vertically differentiated market is often referred to as a “natural
oligopoly” for traditional goods, whereas it can be regarded as a “natural monopoly” for
information goods.
Keywords: Information Goods, Versioning Strategies, Pricing Strategies, Duopoly Competi-
tion, Entry Deterrence.
1 Introduction
Characterized by large sunk costs of development, and by negligible costs of reproduction
and distribution, information goods show substantial economies of scale (Shapiro and Varian,
1999). Jones and Mendelson (2005) categorize information goods as: i) computer software
including operation systems, programming tools and applications; ii) online services such
as internet search engines and portals; iii) online content such as information provided by
Lexis/Nexis, Dow Jones, and Reuters; and iv) other digitalized information goods such
as digitalized music, movies and books. An additional unit of an information good can
be produced and distributed at negligible cost by allowing it to be downloadable over the
Internet (Jones and Mendelson, 2005). Broad adoption of e-commerce, secure and convenient
online payments and high-speed internet connections greatly lower the transaction costs.
Another notable feature of information goods is that after the highest quality version
of the information good has been developed, the development of its vertically degraded
versions is usually less costly. Versioning is to “offer a product line and let users choose the
version of the product most appropriate for them (Shapiro and Varian, 1999)”, which is often
referred to as “the second degree price discrimination”. Developments in software engineering
have made versioning of most computer software virtually cost-free. Thus, information
goods producers can easily provide vertically differentiated products, thereby segmenting the
market to maximize profit (Wei and Nault, 2005). Hahn (2001) investigates the functional
quality degradation of software and shows that “the functional quality degradation is an
effective consumer screening device, especially when consumers’ valuation for each function
is negatively correlated”. Bhargava and Choudhary (2005) reach a similar conclusion under
more general settings about consumer heterogeneity and utility functions.
With the ease of versioning, product differentiation and pricing strategies of information
goods are different from traditional goods, especially in the context of competition. Leading
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producers of information goods usually have substantial market power. As of 2002, Microsoft
Windows controlled 97.46% of the global desktop operation systems market (Windows IT
Pro, 2002). Oracle’s market share on Linux was 80.6% in 2005, up from 76.1% in 2004
and its revenues in the fast growing Linux market were up 95% in 2005 (www.oracle.com).
According to the Nielsen cabinet, as the most popular search engine on the web, Google had
a market share of 54% in 2006, ahead of Yahoo! (23%) and MSN (13%) (www.google.com,
2006). Competition for information goods is more intense than traditional goods and the
winners usually dominate the market. Meanwhile, with potential competition, producers of
information goods have an incentive to improve quality. They launch their highest quality
version, or upgrade the old version, whenever possible, even if they lose money at the margin
by cannibalizing the existing market share of the old version (Nault and Vandenbosch, 1996).
It is also common for the software producers to release a buggier product early and patch it
later to grab the “first mover advantage” in the market (Arora, Caulkins, and Telang, 2006).
The subsequent questions are: 1) why do leading producers of information goods dominate
their market? and, 2) why is a monopoly producer so eager to improve the quality of its
information goods under potential competition?
To address the above questions, this paper proposes a duopoly model to analyze the
optimal price and quality choices for information goods, and discusses the effectiveness of
implementing versioning strategies to deter entry in the competitive environment. We find
that in a competitive environment firms always provide higher quality information goods
with a better “price quality ratio” than in a monopoly. In the high-end market an incum-
bent monopolist can strategically set its quality to deter entry. In the low-end market, the
incumbent monopolist can effectively implement versioning strategies to deter entry and dif-
ferent versions exist as a signal to prevent potential entry. A vertically differentiated market
is often referred to as a “natural oligopoly” for traditional goods (Shaked and Sutton, 1983),
whereas it can be regarded as a “natural monopoly” for information goods.
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2 Literature Review
There is broad literature in the research of price discrimination, product differentiation and
market segmentation. Frank, Massy and Wind (1972) propose a model of third degree
price discrimination which assumes market segments are isolated and consumers from one
segment cannot purchase goods from another segment. Moorthy (1984) investigates on con-
sumer self-selection and proposes product line design strategies based on second degree price
discrimination. By using consumer self-selection, consumers choose between products in
different market segments based on their valuation for the product. Product differentiation
becomes the focus for firms to implement price discrimination. Pricing of products designed
for different market segments are related with each other, and cannibalization occurs between
different market segments. Moorthy and Png (1992) further address market cannibalization
using timing as an effective way to reduce cannibalization when consumers are relatively
more impatient than the seller. For most information goods distributed through Internet,
consumer self-selection is the only choice for firms deciding their pricing strategies. Re-
cent literature has focused on effective methods in dealing with market cannibalization and
optimal product line design.
Price discrimination and product differentiation are common ways this problem has been
addressed. Vertical differentiation and pricing strategies are modeled in different contexts
such as network externalities (Jing, 2002), competition (Jones and Mendelson, 2005) and
anti-piracy (Wu, Chen and Anandalingam, 2003). They all reach the conclusion that verti-
cal differentiation is not optimal without certain constraints, consistent with Bhargava and
Choudhary (2001). Bhargava and Choudhary (2005) examine nonlinear utility functions
for information goods and propose that vertical differentiation is optimal when lower type
consumers have greater ratios of valuations than higher type consumers. Lilien, Kotler and
Moorthy (1992) recognized that vertical differentiation would be attractive when consumers
were sufficiently heterogeneous because versions could differentiate users. Bakos and Bryn-
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jolfsson (1999) studied the strategy of bundling information goods and found that bundling
large numbers of unrelated information goods can be profitable, but when different market
segments of consumers differ systematically in their valuations for goods, simple bundling is
no longer optimal. Sundararajan (2004) showed that with information goods fixed-fee and
usage-based pricing can be used together to maximize firm profits.
Competition with information goods has been the focus of additional research. Nault
(1997) examined quality differentiation using inter-organizational information systems (IOS)
and found that IOS could effectively differentiate consumers and reduce competition in
duopoly. Dewan, Jing and Seidmann (2003) developed a duopoly model where firms could
produce both standard products and customized products. They found that “when firms
face a fixed entry cost and adopt customization sequentially, the first entrant always achieves
an advantage and may be able to deter subsequent entry by choosing its customization scope
strategically” (Dewan, et. al, 2003). Choudhary, Ghose, Mukopadhyay and Rajan (2005)
proposed a personalized pricing (PP) strategy where firms produced vertically differentiated
goods and could perfectly identify valuations of heterogenous consumers. They found that
“while PP results in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price competition
between firms” (Choudhary, et. al 2005).
Empirical research has also been conducted to investigate product and pricing strategies.
Nault and Dexter (1995) found that with the adoption of a specific IT system - the cardlock
system in a commercial fueling company, successfully differentiated its product and main-
tained a premium between 5− 12% of retail price of the fuel commodity. Cottrell and Nault
(2004) analyzed product variety and scope economies in the microcomputer software indus-
try and found that changes in product variety through new product introductions improve
firm performance, but extensions to existing products hinder the performance of the firm
and the product. Ghose, Smith and Telang (2005) empirically analyzed the degree to which
used products cannibalize new product sales for books and its welfare impact using a dataset
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collected from Amazon.com’s new and used book marketplaces. They found that used books
are poor substitutes for new books for most of Amazon’s customers, but the existence of
used book marketplace increases consumer surplus and total welfare. Ghose and Sundarara-
jan (2005) estimated the extent of quality degradation associated with software versioning
using a 7-month, 108-product panel of software sales from Amazon.com and found that an
increase in the total number of versions is associated with an increase in the difference in
quality between the highest and lowest quality versions, which is consistent with the theory
of vertical differentiation.
In this paper, we analyze the quality and price choices of the information goods producers
under monopoly and duopoly. We set up our notation and assumptions in section 3, analyze
the monopoly environment in section 4, and examine a simultaneous move duopoly environ-
ment in section 5. In section 6, we discuss the sequential move duopoly environment and
entry deterrence strategies. We further compare different situations where firms choose their
optimal strategy among entry deterrence, rivalry clear-out or coexistence. Social welfare
implications in different situations are analyzed in section 7. Discussion and future research
are included in section 8.
3 Notation and Assumptions
In our model, consumers are heterogeneous and uniformly distributed in their individual
taste for quality. We denote individual consumer taste as θ which is normalized to be in the
interval [0, 1]. The consumer taste θ indicates a consumer’s marginal valuation for quality.
A consumer has positive utility for one unit only. The total market size is normalized to 1.
Consumers select their favorite good to maximize their consumer surplus U(q, θ) − p, where
p is the price of the good. Denoting quality as q ∈ [0,+∞), we take a consumer’s utility to
be multiplicative in taste and quality. This is our first assumption:
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Assumption 1 U(q, θ) = θ q.
If a firm produces an information good of quality q, it incurs development cost C(q) and
zero marginal cost of reproduction and distribution. The development cost C(q) is twice
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in q. This is our second assumption:
Assumption 2 C ′(q) > 0 and C ′′(q) > 0.
Denoting different quality versions with subscripts, after the highest quality qH of the
information good is produced, firm may degrade it to generate a lower quality version qL.
We assume versioning costs are negligible compared with the development cost, effectively
setting versioning costs to zero. This is our third assumption:
Assumption 3 Versioning costs are zero after the highest quality information good is pro-
duced.
Firms know the distribution of consumers but not their individual type. Thus only second
degree price discrimination is possible. Firms choose price, quality and versioning strategies
to maximize their profit. This and notation used later are summarized in Table 1.
4 A Monopoly Model
We assume the monopolist provides N versions of the information good with quality lev-
els Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qN−1, qN). Without loss of generality, we assume q1 > q2 > . . . >
qN−1 > qN . The highest quality q1 is developed first, and the subsequent degraded qualities
q2, . . . , qN−1, qN are produced through versioning. Let P = (p1, p2, . . . , pN−1, pN) denote the
relevant prices for the above quality levels, and D(P, qi) denotes the demand for the good
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Table 1. Summary of Key Notation
Symbol Explanation
U(q, θ) Utility that consumer type θ gets from information good with quality
level q
C(q) Cost function of developing information good with quality level q
Π(.) profit function of the firm
p price level of the information good
q quality level of the information good
θ consumer type
k price quality ratio
t comparative quality ratio
M monopoly firm
A,B firms who enter the specific market simultaneously
I incumbent firm
E potential entrant firm
*We use superscripts for variables and subscripts for functions to indicate variables and
relevant functional forms for firms in different settings.
with quality qi given the price set P . The monopolist chooses quality levels and prices to
maximize profit. The profit function for the monopolist is
Π(P (Q), Q) =
N∑
i=1
piD(P, qi)− C(q1).
The provision of N different quality levels divides the target market into N + 1 segments,
where the last segment is when consumers do not purchase. In market segment i where the
consumer only chooses between buying the good designed for her segment and not buying,
we define θi as the indifferent consumer and the price assignment is
pi = U(qi, θi).
In the market segment i where the consumer chooses between buying the good qi and a good
qj designed for another segment j, we define θi as the indifferent consumer type and the
price assignment is
pi = pj + U(qi, θi)− U(qj, θi).
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In a vertically differentiated market, indifferent consumer types only exist between two
contiguous segments. Using the price assignments the indifferent consumer type is defined
by θi = (pi − pi+1)/(qi − qi+1), for i = {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, and θN = pN/qN . Consumers
in market segment [θ1, 1] buy good with quality q1, consumers in [θi, θi−1), i = {2, . . . , N}
buy versions with quality qi, and consumers in [0, θN) do not buy. The profit maximization
problem of the monopolist can be rewritten as
max
P (Q),Q
Π = p1(1− p
1 − p2
q1 − q2 ) +
N−1∑
i=2
pi(
pi−1 − pi
qi−1 − qi −
pi − pi+1
qi − qi+1 ) + p
N(
pN−1 − pN
qN−1 − qN −
pN
qN
)− C(q1)
3 p1 > p2 > . . . > pN ; q1 > q2 > . . . > qN .
The first term in the above profit function indicates revenue generated from version
q1, the second term indicates revenue generated from versions q2, · · · , qN−1, the third term
indicates revenue generated from version qN . The last term indicates development cost for
version q1. For the optimal prices and qualities P and Q, using the envelope theorem, we
have ∂Π(P (Q), Q)/∂P = 0. Thus we have
p1 − p2
q1 − q2 =
p2 − p3
q2 − q3 = . . . =
pN−1 − pN
qN−1 − qN =
pN
qN
=
1
2
,
meaning that all the indifferent consumer types are equal. Therefore, except for segment 1,
the demand for all the other market segments is zero. It indicates that a profit maximizing
monopolist only provides one version. This result is consistent with the findings of Jones
and Mendelson (1998), Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) and basic argument of Jing (2001),
and Wu, Chen and Anandalingam (2003).
We denote the optimal price and quality of the only version by pM and qM , respectively.
The optimal “price quality ratio” is denoted by kM = pM/qM . We have the following
proposition:
Proposition 1:
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1. An information good monopolist provides only one version.
2. The necessary condition for a monopolist to profitably launch the information good is
that the marginal cost of developing the information good is greater than the average
cost of the development.
3. The optimal “price quality ratio” of the information good provided by the monopolist
is 1/2.
All the proofs are in the Appendix. The monopolist does not cover the market. Although
the optimal price quality ratio of the information good provided by the monopolist is 1/2, if
the price quality ratio is less than 1/2, then more of the market is covered and the market is
fully covered when the “price quality ratio” is zero. If the price quality ratio is greater than
1/2, then less of the market is covered and the market fails when the price quality ratio is
greater than 1.
5 Simultaneous Move Duopoly
We now examine the case where two firms A and B are both in the market. Each firm
develops their version quality based on the quality level of the other firm. The information
goods are assumed to be vertically differentiated. In the appendix we provide detailed proof
that it is profit maximizing for either firm to provide only one version of the information
good. Each firm also signals its proposed quality level of the good to each other. After the
information goods are produced, both firms choose prices according to Bertrand competition.
Consumers choose their preferred goods based on the qualities and prices of the information
goods.
The duopoly model is thus a typical two stage game:
9
• Stage 1: Firm A and B develop information goods with quality levels qA and qB.
• Stage 2: Both firms compete in prices.
We consider pure strategy SPNE (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) of this game. If
both firm develop information goods with the same quality level, Bertrand competition drives
prices to zero, which is not an SPNE. Without loss of generality, we suppose qA > qB. The
costs for firm A to develop qA is CA(q
A), and for firm B to develop qB is CB(q
B). The cost
functions of firms A and B need not to be the same.
Let θA denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying goods of quality qA
and qB, and θB denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying good qB and not
buying. Similar to the analysis in the previous section, we have θA = (pA − pB)/(qA − qB),
and θB = pB/qB. We work backwards to solve the duopoly model.
Stage 2. For firm A the profit function is expressed as
ΠA(p
A, qA) = pA(1− p
A − pB
qA − qB )− CA(q
A). (1)
Using the first order condition with respect to pA to get the best response function of firm
A we have1
2pA − pB = qA − qB. (2)
For firm B the profit function is expressed as
ΠB(p
B, qB) = pB(
pA − pB
qA − qB −
pB
qB
)− CB(qB).
Using the first order condition with respect to pB to get the best response function of firm
B we have
pA/(2pB) = qA/qB. (3)
1The sufficient second order conditions are satisfied for (1) and the remaining optimization problems.
Details are available upon request.
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Solving (2) and (3),
pA = 2qA(qA − qB)/(4qA − qB) (4)
and
pB = qB(qA − qB)/(4qA − qB). (5)
The equilibrium price quality ratio of good provided by firm A is denoted by kA = pA/qA
and the equilibrium price quality ratio of good provided by firm B is denoted by kB = pB/qB.
We also denote the “comparative quality ratio” by t where t = qA/qB. Since qA > qB, we
have t > 1. Thus, the solutions for pA and pB in (4) and (5) can be rewritten as
kA = 2(t− 1)/(4t− 1) (6)
and
kB = (t− 1)/(4t− 1). (7)
The optimal price quality ratio of the good provided by firm A is twice as much as that
provided by firm B. For t > 1, we have kA < 1/2 and kB < 1/4. It is not surprising that
both firms provide goods with better price quality ratio than that of the monopolist.
From (4) and (5) we get θA = (2t− 1)/(4t− 1) < 1/2, thus 1− θA = 2t/(4t− 1) > 1/2.
This indicates that firm A has a market share of more than 1/2, which is larger than that of
the monopolist. Also we have θB = (t− 1)/(4t− 1) < 1/4, thus θA− θB = t/(4t− 1) > 1/4.
It indicates that the low quality firm B has a market share of exactly a half of firm A. The
total market served is more than 3/4. Therefore, the total market served expands more than
50 percent in duopoly competition.
Stage 1. Substituting (4) and (5) back into the profit functions of firms A and B, we have
ΠA(q
A, qB) = 4(qA)2(qA − qB)/(4qA − qB)2 − CA(qA)
and
ΠB(q
A, qB) = qAqB(qA − qB)/(4qA − qB)2 − CB(qB).
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Firms A and B choose quality levels qA and qB to maximize their profits, thus we have
∂ΠA/∂q
A = 0 and ∂ΠB/∂q
B = 0. The equilibrium quality levels qA and qB are determined
by
C ′A(q
A) = 4t(4t2 − 3t+ 2)/(4t− 1)3
and
C ′B(q
B) = t2(4t− 7)/(4t− 1)3.
For t > 1, we have C ′A(q
A) > 1/4 and C ′B(q
B) < 1/16. If all the firms have the same
technology, CA(q) = CB(q), then we have q
B < qM < qA. This means that the high quality
firm produces a higher quality information good in a duopoly than a monopolist.
To summarize the above, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2:
1. It is profit maximizing for either firm to provide only one version of the information
good.
2. With the same technology, the high quality firm in duopoly competition produces an
information good with higher quality than a monopolist.
3. Both firms provide information goods with better price quality ratios in duopoly com-
petition than in monopoly.
4. In duopoly competition, the high quality firm has exactly twice as much market share
as the low quality firm. The total market share expands more than 50 percent than the
monopoly firm.
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6 Sequential Move and Entry Deterrence
In this section we show that in a sequential duopoly game, the first mover can strategically
set the quality level of the information good to deter entry from the high-end market while
implementing a versioning strategy to deter entry from the low-end market.
6.1 Entry Deterrence from the High-end Market
In a sequential game, the incumbent firm I first develops an information good at quality
level qI and sets price pI . The potential entrant determines whether to enter the information
good market or not. If entry is profitable, the entrant firm E determines its optimal quality
level qE to develop and sets price pE according to Bertrand competition. Consumers choose
their preferred goods after the qualities and prices of the information goods are determined.
In this sub-section we analyze potential entry from the high-end market, which means
that the entrant develops quality qE > qI . Once entry occurs, the equilibrium prices of both
firms are determined in the same manner as in the simultaneous game. We still denote the
comparative quality ratio here by t = qE/qI . Thus, we have the equilibrium prices as before
except with incumbent and entrant labelling
pE = 2qE(t− 1)/(4t− 1)
and
pI = qI(t− 1)/(4t− 1).
The profits of both firms are
ΠE(q
E, qI) = qE(4t(t− 1)/(4t− 1)2 − CE(qE)/qE) (8)
and
ΠI(q
E, qI) = qI(t(t− 1)/(4t− 1)2 − CI(qI)/qI). (9)
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From the first order condition of (8), the equilibrium quality level qE is determined by
C ′E(q
E) = 4t(4t2 − 3t+ 2)/(4t− 1)3 (10)
From (10), we get C ′E(q
E) is decreasing with t. Thus, if the incumbent firm I strategically
sets its initial quality level qI higher, then t decreases and the optimal qE increases. We
notice that when t decreases and qE increases, in the profit function ΠE, the first part
4t(t − 1)/(4t − 1)2 decreases while the second part CE(qE)/qE increases. The incumbent
firm I can strategically set its initial quality level qI such that the profit of entrant from the
high-end market equals to zero. The strategic quality level qI is determined by
CE(q
E)/qE = 4t(t− 1)/(4t− 1)2
where we set the optimal profit of the entrant firm E as 0, and
C ′E(q
E) = 4t(4t2 − 3t+ 2)/(4t− 1)3.
which is exactly equation (10) that determines the equilibrium quality level qE.
We notice that the optimal entry deterrence quality level of the incumbent is dependent
on the development cost function of the potential entrant. From discussions in this section,
we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3:
1. The incumbent firm can strategically set its quality to deter entry from the high-end
market.
2. The entry deterrence quality level of the information good is never lower than that in
monopoly.
3. With the same technology of developing an information good, incumbent can always
profitably deter entry.
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We recognize that entry deterrence may not be consistent with profit maximization.
When entry deterrence is consistent with profit maximization, the information good producer
can be well regarded as a “natural monopoly”. But usually they are not the same. In order
to effectively deter entry, the incumbent firm may have to sacrifice its profit. Under certain
conditions entry deterrence may even incur negative profit for the incumbent firm. In the
appendix we discuss those conditions in more detail.
However, for some strategic considerations such as the “top dog strategy” that overin-
vestment makes the incumbent tougher (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984), the incumbent firm
may still choose to overinvest in development to deter entry. If the incumbent firm has sunk
its development cost for entry deterrence quality level qI , then the enhanced qI is always a
credible threat to the potential entrant. The effect of the excess investment in the devel-
opment of the information good is equivalent to the excess capacity investment in Dixit’s
model of entry deterrence where “the threat of a predatory output increase after entry is
made credible by carrying excess capacity prior to entry” (Dixit, 1980).
6.2 Entry Deterrence from the Low-end Market
When the incumbent strategically sets its quality at a higher level to deter entry from the
high-end market, it opens another door to the potential entrant - entry may occur from the
low-end market.
Under the strategic quality level qI determined in the previous sub-section, without
versioning strategies, potential entrant firm determines its optimal quality qE to enter the
low-end market by
C ′E(q
E) = (qI)2(4qI − 7qE)/(4qI − qE)3.
The optimal profit for the entrant is
ΠE(q
E) = qEqI(qI − qE)/(4qI − qE)2 − CE(qE).
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If ΠE(q
E) ≤ 0, then entry is deterred. Otherwise, we may consider a versioning strategy
to deter entry from the low-end market. In this sub-section, we propose a model where the
incumbent strategically degrades its high quality information good to generate a low quality
version to deter entry from the low-end market.
In the model setting, the incumbent has already developed its high quality version qIH .
It generates a low quality version qIL in order to deter entry from the low-end market. The
potential entrant determines whether to enter the information good market or not. If entry
is profitable, the entrant determines its optimal quality level qE, and prices pE, pIH and p
I
L
are set according to the Bertrand competition. Consumers select their preferred goods after
the qualities and prices of the information goods are determined.
In this model we assume qIL < q
E < qIH .
2 In this situation, let θIH denote the consumer
type which is indifferent between buying information goods qIH and q
E, θE denote the con-
sumer type which is indifferent between buying information goods qE and qIL, and θ
I
L denote
the consumer type which is indifferent between buying information good qIL and not buying.
Similar to the analysis earlier, we have θIH = (p
I
H −pE)/(qIH − qE), θE = (pE−pIL)/(qE− qIL),
and θIL = p
I
L/q
I
L.
The profit function ΠI for the incumbent firm is expressed as
ΠI(p
I
H , p
I
L, q
I
H , q
I
L) = p
I
H(1−
pIH − pE
qIH − qE
) + pIL(
pE − pIL
qE − qIL
− p
I
L
qIL
)− CI(qIH). (11)
And the profit function ΠE for the entrant is expressed as
ΠE(p
E, qE) = pE(
pIH − pE
qIH − qE
− p
E − pIL
qE − qIL
)− CE(qE). (12)
From the first order conditions of equation (11) with respect to pIH and p
I
L, and of equation
2One might argue that potential entry may come from even lower-end market, which means qE < qIL. In
that case, incumbent firm can generate another lower version to deter entry, with the same mechanism as
discussed in this sub-section.
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(12) with respect to pE, we get the best reponse functions as following,
2pIH −pE = qIH − qE
−qILpE +2qEpIL = 0
(qE − qIL)pIH −2(qIH − qIL)pE +(qIH − qE)pIL = 0
Applying the Cramer’s Rule, we have
Λ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2, −1, 0
0, −qIL, 2qE
qE − qIL, −2(qIH − qIL), qIH − qE
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2(4qIHqE − qIHqIL − (qE)2 − 2qEqIL)
We get the equilibrium prices for pIH , p
E and pIL as following
pIH = (q
I
H − qE)(4qIHqE − qIHqIL − 3qEqIL)/Λ
and
pE = 2qE(qIH − qE)(qE − qIL)/Λ
and
pIL = q
I
L(q
I
H − qE)(qE − qIL)/Λ.
We notice that if qE = qIL, then the equilibrium prices p
E = pIL = 0 and p
I
H = (q
I
H−qE)/2.
It indicates that firm with information good of higher quality can always drive the rival out
of the market by generating a sub-version of the same quality. Bertrand competition drives
prices of the low quality information goods down to zero.
We denote the comparative quality ratio of qIH , q
E with respect to qIL by t
H = qIH/q
I
L
and tE = qE/qIL. The optimal price quality ratio of versions q
I
H and q
I
L provided by firm I
are denoted by kH = pIH/q
I
H and k
L = pIL/q
I
L, respectively. The optimal price quality ratio
of versions qE provided by firm E is denoted by kE = pE/qE. From the equilibrium prices
equations, we get
kH =
(tH − tE)(4tE − 1− 3tE/tH)
2(4tHtE − tH − 2tE − (tE)2)
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and
kE =
(tH − tE)(tE − 1)
(4tHtE − tH − 2tE − (tE)2)
and
kL =
(tH − tE)(tE − 1)
2(4tHtE − tH − 2tE − (tE)2) .
From the above equations, we have kE = 2kL and kH > 2kE. It indicates that the equilibrium
price quality ratio of version qIH is more than four times that of the low quality version q
I
L
offered by the same firm I.
Substituting the equilibrium prices back into the profit function for the firm I and E, we
have
ΠI(q
I
H , q
E, qIL) =
(qIH − qE)
Λ2
[(4qIHq
E − qIHqIL − 3qEqIL)2 + qEqIL(qIH − qE)(qE − qIL)]− CI(qIH)
and
ΠE(q
I
H , q
E, qIL) =
4(qE)2(qIH − qE)(qIH − qIL)(qE − qIL)
Λ2
− CE(qE).
Taking the partial derivative of ΠE with respect to q
I
L, we have,
∂ΠE(q
I
H , q
E, qIL)
∂qIL
=
−8(qE)2(qIH − qE)2
Λ3
(2qIHq
E + qIHq
I
L + (q
E)2 − 4qEqIL) < 0.
It means the higher the quality level qIL of the sub-version, the lower the profit of the
potential entrant E. Therefore, the incumbent firm I can strategically set the quality level
qIL of the sub-version to deter entry.
In order to effectively deter entry, qIL must be set so that ΠE(q
E) ≤ 0. Through the
envelope theorem, we have ∂ΠE(q
E)/∂qE = 0. Thus, the strategic quality level of the low
quality version qIL is determined by
CE(q
E)/qE =
4(qE)(qIH − qE)(qIH − qIL)(qE − qIL)
Λ2
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and
C ′E(q
E) =
8qE(qIH − qIL)
Λ3
[qIH(q
I
H − qE)(4(qE)2 + 2(qIL)2 − 3qEqIL)
+qEqIL(q
E − qIL)(2qE + qIH)− 3(qE)3(qIH − qIL)].
Again, the optimal entry deterrence quality level of the sub-version depends on the develop-
ment cost function of the potential entrant.
We also notice that
∂ΠI(q
I
H , q
I
L)
∂qIL
=
−2(qE)2(qIH − qE)2
Λ3
(20qIHq
E + qIHq
I
L + (q
E)2 − 22qEqIL) < 0.
This inequality means that increasing the quality of the sub-version also lower the profit
of the incumbent firm. This is equivalent to “the lean and hungry look” effect referred to
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) where the incumbent firm underinvests to accommodate
entry. If the entrant has already entered from the low-end market, it is never optimal for
the incumbent to version its information good.
If the incumbent firm can adjust its price to respond to entry very quickly and can
convey this behavior credibly to the potential entry, once the incumbent firm successfully
deters entry, it can remain as a monopolist in the information good market. In that case, as
we discussed earlier, the monopolist sells only the highest version. Different versions can be
developed by the incumbent and sold in limited range. These versions exist as a signal to
deter potential entry. In this perspective, it is always profit maximizing to generate the sub-
version to deter entry when versioning costs are negligible compared with the development
costs. The following proposition concludes this sub-section.
Proposition 4:
1. The incumbent firm can strategically degrade its high quality information good to gen-
erate a low quality version to deter entry from the low-end market.
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2. If the entrant already entered from the low-end market, it is never optimal for the
incumbent firm to version its information good.
3. The entry deterrence strategy in the low-end market is always consistent with the in-
cumbent’s profit maximizing strategy.
4. In the entry deterrence situation, versioning functions as signal rather than profit max-
imizing method.
6.3 Entry Deterrence, Rivalry Clear-out or Coexistence
We know from the previous discussion that the incumbent can strategically develop infor-
mation goods at higher quality level to deter entry from the high-end market and generate
versions to deter entry into the low-end market. The key questions here are: i) Is the threat
a credible one to deter entry? ii)Is it worthwhile for the incumbent to deter entry? iii) If ri-
valry already exists in the market, is it profit maximizing for one firm to drive its competitor
out? If the answer of any of the above questions is “no”, then firms may choose to coexist
with its competitors.
Rivalry Clear-out & Coexistence. We first consider the case where firms A and B are
already in the market with information goods qA and qB. Without loss of generality, we
suppose qA > qB. Since the development costs are sunk and there is no marginal cost, a
firm will not exit the market if the price of its good is greater than zero. From section 5, we
know that in equilibrium, profits for firm A and B are
ΠA(q
A) = 4(qA)2(qA − qB)/(4qA − qB)2 − CA(qA)
and
ΠB(q
B) = qAqB(qA − qB)/(4qA − qB)2 − CB(qB).
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Obviously, firm B with a lower quality information good cannot drive firm A with a
high quality good out of the market. For firm A to drive out firm B, it can generate a
lower quality version with quality which is exactly qB and set its price at zero, which is the
equilibrium price according to the Bertrand competition. From discussion in the previous
section, we know the equilibrium profit for firm B is zero and profit for firm A is
ΠA(q
A, qB) = (qA − qB)/4− CA(qA)
The first part of the above profit equation is the revenue generated from qA and the second
part is the development costs of qA. It is straightforward to see that ΠA(q
A, qB) < ΠA(q
A).
Therefore, firm A is better off coexisting with firm B.
Entry Deterrence & Coexistence. We now compare profits under entry deterrence and
coexistence. From discussion in the previous section, we know it is always profit maximizing
for the incumbent to generate a lower quality version to deter entry from the low-end market.
However, versioning is not a credible threat to the potential entry. If entrant actually enters
the market, it is profit maximizing for the incumbent to withdraw the lower quality version
and only sell the highest version. To make versioning a credible threat, the incumbent must
have some mechanism to tie the lower quality version with its higher quality version.
In the high-end market, the sunk costs of development pose a credible threat to deter
potential entry. However, the entry deterrence strategy may not be consistent with the
profit maximizing strategy. As we discussed previously, if entry is allowed from the high-end
market, the optimal quality level for the incumbent is qB and the optimal quality level for the
entrant is qA as discussed in section 5 and the relevant profit of the incumbent is denoted by
ΠDI (q
A, qB). We have ΠDI (q
A, qB) = qAqB(qA−qB)/(4qA−qB)2−CI(qB). If entry is deterred
with optimal entry deterrence quality level qI and the incumbent behaves as a monopoly,
the relevant profit of the incumbent is denoted by ΠMI (q
I). From discussions in section 4,
we have ΠMI (q
I) = qI/4− CI(qI). And we have:
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• If ΠMI (qI) ≥ ΠDI (qA, qB), then the entry deterrence strategy is consistent with the profit
maximizing strategy. It is profit maximizing for the incumbent firm to strategically
set its quality to deter entry from the high-end market.
• If ΠMI (qI) < ΠDI (qA, qB), then the entry deterrence strategy is not consistent with
the profit maximizing strategy. It is profit maximizing for the incumbent firm to
accommodate entry.
As we mentioned in proposition 2, with the same technology for developing an information
good, incumbent can always profitably deter entry. Thus, for the potential entrant, it must
have superior cost advantage in developing information good to enter the market.3
7 Welfare Implications
Because marginal cost of producing information good is zero, to be socially optimal the price
of the information good must also be zero. We denote the socially optimal quality by qS and
the optimal social welfare by WS, where q
S is determined to maximize total social welfare
WS. We know WS(q
S) =
∫ 1
0 q
Sθdθ − C(qS), so the optimal quality of the information good
is decided by C
′
(qS) = 1/2. All consumers enjoy qS at price zero with total surplus qS/2,
firm incurs negative profit −C(qS) (the sunk development cost). The optimal social welfare
is WS(q
S) = qS/2− C(qS).
In a monopoly, the optimal price pM and quality qM are determined to maximize the
profit of the firm. From section 4, we know qM are determined by C
′
(qM) = 1/4 and price
pM is set equal to qM/2. Only half of the consumers in the market enjoy the information good
and the total consumer surplus is qM/8. The monopolist gains profit ΠM = q
M/4− C(qM).
The total social welfare is WM(q
M) = 3qM/8− C(qM).
3Applying a timing game model, Nault and Vandenbosch (2000) introduce the concept of “disruptive
technologies” to explain entry in next generation information technology markets.
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Table 2. Comparison of Socially Optimal and Monopoly
Socially Optimal Monopoly
Quality C
′
(qS) = 1/2 C
′
(qM) = 1/4
Price 0 qM/2
Market Coverage 1 1/2
Consumer Surplus qS/2 qM/8
Firm Profit −C(qS) qM/4− C(qM)
Total Social Welfare qS/2− C(qS) 3qM/8− C(qM)
The social optimal and the monopoly represent two extreme situation where the first
focuses on social welfare while the second focuses on the firm profits. The Table 2 shows the
comparison of these two situations.
From the comparison, we see that the socially optimal quality, consumer surplus and total
social welfare are higher than those of monopoly. Actually, at the social optimal, quality,
consumer surplus and total social welfare are the highest among all situations we discuss in
the paper. The monopolist obtains its optimal profit by serving only half of the market. In
all the situations, the monopolist obtains the highest profit.
In the simultaneous move of the duopoly case, given the same technology, firm A produces
qA which is higher than the monopoly qM while firm B produces qB which is lower than the
monopoly qM . The market coverage of qA is more than 1/2 and the total market coverage
is more than 3/4. The total profits of firm A and B are less but the total consumer surplus
is higher than that of the monopoly. The total social welfare is also higher than that in the
monopoly. In the entry deterrence situation, if the incumbent firm I chooses to accommodate
entry, then it is equivalent to the simultaneous move of the duopoly case. If the incumbent
firm successfully deters entry, it acts like a monopolist. But in this case, the incumbent
firm usually provide quality level qI which is higher than the monopoly qM . So the profit of
producing qI is less than that of the monopolist who produces qM . The consumer surplus
is higher in the successful entry deterrence case and the market coverage is the same as
23
the monopoly case. In this situation, the total social welfare cannot be determined without
specifying a development cost function.
8 Conclusions
This paper focuses on analysis of the competition of vertically differentiated information
goods. Under assumptions of linear utility function and convex development costs, we explain
why competition of information goods is so intense that leading producers usually dominate
the market. We have shown that under competition, producers always offer information
goods with better “price quality ratio” than in a monopoly and the market is better covered
as well. Although in a simultaneous move duopoly game neither of the producers versions
their relevant information goods, in a sequential game the incumbent firm can strategically
set the quality level of the information good to deter entry from the high-end market while
implementing a versioning strategy to deter entry from the low-end market.
We further show that although the sunk costs of development pose a credible threat to
deter potential entry from the high-end market, it may not be consistent with the profit
maximizing strategy. It is always profit maximizing for the incumbent to implement ver-
sioning strategies to deter entry from the low-end market and different versions exist as a
signal to prevent potential entry. However, versioning is not a credible threat to the potential
entrant. To make versioning a credible threat, the incumbent must have some mechanism
to tie its lower quality version good with its higher quality version to make the potential
entrant believe that the lower quality version good will not be withdrawn from the market
in the post-entry situation. Social welfare is also discussed according to different situations
and we find that consumer surplus is always better under competition (including potential
competition) than in a monopoly.
The limitations of the paper lie in the functional form of consumers’ utility and the
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distribution of consumers’ types. Our results rely on the assumptions that a consumer’s
utility is multiplicative in taste and quality, and that consumers are uniformly distributed
in their individual taste for quality. Further research can generalize the utility function
and consumers’ distribution. In the meanwhile, there are two possible extensions for this
paper. The first one is to consider network externality effect. In that case, the various
degraded versions may not just act as a “signal” to deter entry, but effective means to
maximize profit (Jing, 2002). The other extension is to consider temporal issues for the
development and marketing of information goods: timing may have significant impact on the
development costs and the consequent optimal price and quality choices of the information
goods producers.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We already show that in the monopoly environment, only one version is provided. Using
the envelope theorem, it is easy to get KM = pM/qM = 1/2. Substitute back to the
profit function, we have Π = qM/4 − C(qM). Based on the first order condition, we have
C ′(qM) = 1/4. For the monopolist to profitably launch the information good, we have
Π = qM/4 − C(qM) > 0, thus we get C(qM)/qM < 1/4. So we have C(qM)/qM < C ′(qM).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Without loss of generality, we suppose the highest quality produced by firm A is higher than
that by firm B.
Situation I.We first discuss the situation when firm A considers versioning. In this situation
we assume firm A develops its high quality version qAH and degrade it generate a lower version
qAL . Firm B determines its optimal quality level q
B to develop and prices pB, pAH and p
A
L are
set according to the Bertrand competition. There are two cases in this situation:
Case 1: qAL < q
B < qAH.
Let θAH denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information goods q
A
H and
qB, θB denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information goods qB and
qAL , and θ
A
L denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information good q
A
L
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and not buying. We have θAH = (p
A
H − pB)/(qAH − qB), θB = (pB − pAL)/(qB − qAL ), and
θAL = p
A
L/q
A
L .
The profit function ΠA for firm A is expressed as
ΠA(p
A
H , p
A
L , q
A
H , q
A
L ) = p
A
H(1−
pAH − pB
qAH − qB
) + pAL(
pB − pAL
qB − qAL
− p
A
L
qAL
)− CA(qAH). (13)
And the profit function ΠB for firm B is expressed as
ΠB(p
B, qB) = pB(
pAH − pB
qAH − qB
− p
B − pAL
qB − qAL
)− CB(qB). (14)
From the first order conditions of equation (13) with respect to pAH and p
A
L , and of equation
(14) with respect to pB, we get the best reponse functions as following,
2pAH −pB = qAH − qB
−qALpB +2qBpAL = 0
(qB − qAL )pAH −2(qAH − qAL )pB +(qAH − qB)pAL = 0
Applying the Cramer’s Rule, we have
Λ1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2, −1, 0
0, −qAL , 2qB
qB − qAL , −2(qAH − qAL ), qAH − qB
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2(4qAHqB − qAHqAL − (qB)2 − 2qBqAL )
And we get the equilibrium prices for pAH , p
B and pAL as following
pAH = (q
A
H − qB)(4qAHqB − qAHqAL − 3qBqAL )/Λ1
and
pB = 2qB(qAH − qB)(qB − qAL )/Λ1
and
pAL = q
A
L (q
A
H − qB)(qB − qAL )/Λ1.
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Substitute the equilibrium prices back into the profit function for firm A, we have
ΠA(q
A
H , q
B, qAL ) =
(qAH − qB)
(Λ1)2
[(4qAHq
B − qAHqAL − 3qBqAL )2 + qBqAL (qAH − qB)(qB − qAL )]−CA(qAH)
Take partial derivative of ΠA with respect to q
A
L , we have,
∂ΠA(q
A
H , q
B, qAL )
∂qAL
=
−2(qB)2(qAH − qB)2
(Λ1)3
(20qAHq
B + qAHq
A
L + (q
B)2 − 22qBqAL ) < 0.
It means that increasing the quality of the sub-version lowers the profit of the incumbent
firm. Obviously when qAL = 0, ΠA(q
A
H , q
B, qAL ) = ΠA(q
A
H , q
B). To maximize its profit, firm A
sets qAL = 0. So it is not optimal for firm A to version its information good.
Case 2: qB < qAL < q
A
H.
Let θAH denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information goods q
A
H and
qAL , θ
A
L denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information goods q
A
L and
qB, and θB denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information good qB
and not buying. We have θAH = (p
A
H − pAL)/(qAH − qAL ), θAL = (pAL − pB)/(qAL − qB), and
θB = pB/qB.
The profit function ΠA for firm A is expressed as
ΠA(p
A
H , p
A
L , q
A
H , q
A
L ) = p
A
H(1−
pAH − pAL
qAH − qAL
) + pAL(
pAH − pAL
qAH − qAL
− p
A
L − pB
qAL − qB
)− CA(qAH). (15)
And the profit function ΠB for firm B is expressed as
ΠB(p
B, qB) = pB(
pAL − pB
qAL − qB
− p
B
qB
)− CB(qB). (16)
From the first order conditions of equation (15) with respect to pAH and p
A
L , and of equation
(16) with respect to pB, we get the best reponse functions as following,
2pAH −2pAL = qAH − qAL
2pAL −pB = qAL − qB
−qBpAL +2qALpB = 0
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Applying the Cramer’s Rule, we have
Λ2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2, −2, 0
0, 2, −1
0, −qB, 2qAL
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2(4qAL − qB)
And we get the equilibrium prices for pAH , p
A
L and p
B as following
pAH = (4q
A
Hq
A
L − qAHqB − 3qALqB)/Λ2
and
pAL = 4q
A
L (q
A
L − qB)/Λ2
and
pB = 2qB(qAL − qB)/Λ2.
Substitute the equilibrium prices back into the profit function for firm A, we have
ΠA(q
A
H , q
A
L , q
B) =
16qAHq
A
L (q
A
L − qB) + qB(qAH − qAL )(8qAL + qB)
(Λ2)2
− CA(qAH)
Take partial derivative of ΠA with respect to q
A
L , we have,
∂ΠA(q
A
H , q
A
L , q
B)
∂qAL
=
2(qB)2(20qAL + q
B)2
(Λ2)3
> 0.
It means that increasing the quality of the sub-version increases the profit of the incumbent
firm. Obviously when qAL = q
A
H , ΠA(q
A
H , q
B, qAL ) = ΠA(q
A
H , q
B). To maximize its profit, firm
A sets qAL = q
A
H . So it is still not optimal for firm A to version its information good.
Situation II. Then we discuss the situation when firm B considers versioning. In this situ-
ation we assume firm A and B develop their highest quality version qA and qBH , respectively.
Firm B degrades qBH to generate a lower version q
B
L . We have q
B
L < q
B
H < q
A. Prices pA, pBH
and pBL are set according to the Bertrand competition.
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Let θA denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information goods qA
and qBH , θ
B
H denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information goods q
B
H
and qBL , and θ
B
L denote consumer type which is indifferent between buying information good
qBL and not buying. We have θ
A = (pA − pBH)/(qA − qBH), θBH = (pBH − pBL )/(qBH − qBL ), and
θBL = p
B
L/q
B
L .
The profit function ΠA for firm A is expressed as
ΠA(p
A, qA) = pA(1− p
A − pBH
qA − qBH
)− CA(qA). (17)
And the profit function ΠB for firm B is expressed as
ΠB(p
B
H , p
B
L , q
B
H , q
B
L ) = p
B
H(
pA − pBH
qA − qBH
− p
B
H − pBL
qBH − qBL
) + pBL (
pBH − pBL
qBH − qBL
− p
B
L
qBL
)− CB(qBH). (18)
From the first order conditions of equation (18) with respect to pBL , we get
pBH − pBL
qBH − qBL
=
pBL
qBL
It is equivalent that θBH = θ
B
L ! There is no market for q
B
L . So it is not optimal for firm B to
version its information good.
The above discussion can be easily extended to the cases when firm A and firm B consider
generating multi-versions. Thus we conclude that it is profit maximizing for either firm to
provide only one version of the information good in duopoly. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Based on the development cost function CE(.) and the marginal cost function C
′
E(.), we can
derive the strategic quality level qI of the incumbent firm to deter entry. When entry is
successfully deterred, the incumbent firm can behave as a monopoly. It can set the price at
qI/2 to maximize its profit. If qI < qM , then incumbent can further set qI = qM to improve
its profit while still deterring entry. Thus we get the entry deterrence quality level of the
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information good is never lower than that in the monopoly environment.
As we discussed in the paper, if entry is allowed from the high-end market, the optimal
quality level for the incumbent is qB and the optimal quality level for the entrant is qA as
discussed in section 5 and the relevant profit of the incumbent is denoted by ΠDI (q
A, qB). We
have ΠDI (q
A, qB) = qB(t(t−1)/(4t−1)2−CB(qB)/qB), where t = qA/qB. If entry is deterred
with optimal entry deterrence quality level qI and the incumbent behaves as a monopoly,
the relevant profit of the incumbent is denoted by ΠMI (q
I). From discussions in section 4, we
have ΠMI (q
I) = qI/4−CI(qI). If the incumbent and the entry adopt the same technology, we
have CI(q
I)/qI < CI(q
E)/qE = CE(q
E)/qE < 1/4 since qI < qE, thus we get ΠMI (q
I) > 0. It
means with the same technology of developing an information good, incumbent can always
profitably deter entry.
• If ΠMI (qI) < ΠDI (qA, qB), then the entry deterrence strategy is not consistent with the
profit maximizing strategy.
• If ΠMI (qI) < 0, then entry deterrence incurs negative profit for the incumbent firm.
Q.E.D.
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